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Abstract
On October 14, 2008, Hong Kong’s financial secretary announced the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority (HKMA) would use Hong Kong’s Exchange Fund to provide standby capital to
banks if needed. The Contingent Bank Capital Facility (CBCF) was available until the end of
2010 to shore up depositor and investor confidence in the local banking sector and
commenced in parallel with a broader set of announced measures including a consumer
bank deposit guarantee. Twenty-three locally incorporated “Authorized Institutions” were
eligible to access CBCF capital upon request. The provisioning of CBCF capital would be
accompanied by enhanced oversight from the HKMA. The Hong Kong government did not
formalize the structure or terms of CBCF capital, nor did it expressly define any limits for
individual banks or in aggregate. The CBCF never injected any capital and expired as
initially scheduled, at the end of 2010.
Keywords: broad-based, capital injections, broad-based capital injections, Contingent Bank
Capital Facility, Exchange Fund, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Monetary Authority
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At a Glance
Around the peak of the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) in October 2008, Hong Kong’s
domestic banking sector remained in
relatively strong shape. Hong Kong’s local
banks collectively had a regulatory capital
ratio of 14%, which was well over the 8% of
risk-weighted assets that the Basel II
international standards prescribed (HKMA
2008a, 2). However, in keeping with its
international counterparts and responding
to growing domestic financial disturbance,
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)
implemented a capital injection facility. In
addition to a temporary expansion of
deposit insurance and several previously
announced liquidity provisions, the
financial secretary announced on October
14, 2008 that the HKMA would use the
Exchange Fund (the Fund) to provide
standby capital to banks. Under a program
known as the Contingent Bank Capital
Facility (CBCF), locally incorporated
“Authorized Institutions” could request
capital on an as-needed basis. The HKMA
did not formalize the structure or terms of
CBCF capital injections, nor did it make
explicit any maximum investment figure—
either on a per-bank basis or in aggregate.
As the HKMA predicted, the CBCF was
never accessed. The program was allowed
to expire as planned at the end of 2010.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To support stability and confidence in the
Hong Kong banking system by “making available
additional capital to locally incorporated licensed
banks, on request and subject to supervisory
scrutiny should this become necessary” (FS 2008)
Launch Dates

Announcement: October 14,
2008
Operational: October 14,
2008

Wind-Down Dates

December 31, 2010 (HKMA
2010)

Program Size

Not specified. The limit was
the total size of the Exchange
Fund, inclusive of its
borrowing limit

Usage

None (HKMA 2010)

Outcomes

No uptake

Ownership Structure

Government-owned

Notable Features

The design of the capital
injections was not broadly
established; instead,
investment terms were to be
set on a bank-by-bank basis
(HKMA 2008a, 3)

Summary Evaluation

Because no CBCF capital was ever deployed,
there are no specific instances of execution
from which to draw an evaluation.
However, the HKMA consistently described the CBCF as preemptory and intended to ward
off the risk of the Hong Kong banking system becoming undercapitalized, even if the odds
of such risk were remote (HKMA 2008a, 3; Wong and Tang 2008). In this respect, the lack
of usage is consistent with success. In December 2008, the International Monetary Fund
executive board stated it considered the CBCF to be “timely and warranted” (IMF 2008).
However, the effects that CBCF may have had cannot be clearly separated from those of the
other contemporaneous local and global responses.
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Hong Kong Context: 2007–2008
GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

$211.6 billion in 2007
$219.1 billion in 2008
$30,594 in 2007
$31,516 in 2008
As of Q4 2007:
Moody’s: Aa2
S&P: AA
Fitch: AA+
As of Q4 2008:
Moody’s: Aa2
S&P: AA+
Fitch: AA+
$305.3 billion in total assets in 2007
$330.3 billion in total assets in 2008
144.3% in 2007
150.6% in 2008
Data not available for Hong Kong

77.7% of total banking assets in 2007
79.5% of total banking assets in 2008
91% of total banking assets in 2007
Foreign involvement in banking system
91% of total banking assets in 2008
0% of banks owned by the state in
2007
Government ownership of banking system
0% of banks owned by the state in
2008
100% insurance on deposits up to
$64,500 in 2007
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up to
$64,500 in 2008
Source: Bloomberg, World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset, World Bank Global Financial
Development Database, World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey
Five-bank concentration of banking system
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: Hong Kong’s financial secretary announced the Contingent
Bank Capital Facility alongside a broad deposit guarantee scheme.
The Contingent Bank Capital Facility shared a press release with the new expansion of
deposit guarantees (FS 2008), and its establishment also followed several weeks of newly
implemented HKMA liquidity measures (HKMA 2009b). The purpose of the CBCF was to
provide standby capital to banks during the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, the CBCF
came in the middle of a spate of capital injection programs across other developed markets
(COP 2009, 12).
2. Legal Authority: The legal authority for the financial secretary to establish the
CBCF stemmed from the Exchange Fund Ordinance.
The Exchange Fund Ordinance, originally of 1935, established an Exchange Fund to be
under the discretion of the financial secretary in consultation with an Exchange Fund
Advisory Committee. During the Global Financial Crisis, the ordinance’s outlined
authorities provided the secretary the power to use the Fund’s resources to affect the
exchange value of the Hong Kong currency and, secondarily, to engage in stabilizing
transactions that aim to maintain “Hong Kong as an international financial centre” (HKMA
2008a; LegCo n.d.). In addition to the established funds, the Exchange Fund Ordinance also
granted the secretary the legal authority to borrow for the Fund up to HKD 50 billion
(approximately USD 6.5 billion) via sovereign debt issuance, without securing any
additional authorization (LegCo n.d.).
3. Communication: The HKMA created the CBCF to provide standby capital to banks
upon their request, but Chief Executive of the HKMA Joseph Yam described it as a
precautionary measure and did not expect to use it.
Chief Executive of the HKMA Joseph Yam generally referred to the CBCF as a precautionary
measure, enacted in response to adverse foreign developments (FS 2008; Yam 2008b, 12).
Contemporary media coverage, however, noted that Hong Kong’s Bank of East Asia had
started to experience a run in the weeks preceding the announcement of the CBCF (Wan
2008).
Yam consistently reiterated that the HKMA did not expect banks to use the CBCF, due to the
perceived strength of the Hong Kong banking sector (FS 2008; HKMA 2008a, 4; Panel 2008,
11).
4. Governance/Administration: The HKMA operated the CBCF, and the Exchange
Fund would have held any CBCF investments, under the discretion of the
financial secretary.
Given the limited outlines of the program itself as well as its lack of uptake, there does not
seem to have been any material discussion of governance.
Had any banks utilized the CBCF, requesting banks would have been subject to additional
monitoring by the HKMA. Borrowing institutions would have been subject to enhanced
supervisory scrutiny with respect to material deviations in risk, balance sheet structure, or
business strategy. The HKMA would have required borrowing institutions to notify it
before beginning or materially expanding a line of business (HKMA 2008b).
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5. Size, Timing, and Source of Injections: The CBCF was available until the end of
2010 and was backed by the resources of the Exchange Fund.
The Exchange Fund was the source of funds for the CBCF. While policymakers did not offer
an explicit monetary figure, the Fund contained approximately HKD 1.4 trillion
(approximately USD 180 billion) in October 2008 (Wong and Tang 2008; HKMA 2008c). As
noted in Key Design Decision No. 2 above, the financial secretary could also supplement the
Fund’s resources with up to HKD 50 billion (about USD 6.5 billion) of sovereign borrowing.
However, the financial secretary also committed the Fund’s resources to the expanded
deposit guarantee scheme announced alongside the CBCF (FS 2008).
6. Eligible Institutions: Only locally incorporated licensed banks were eligible to
participate in the CBCF.
This list included 23 Hong Kong banks (HKMA 2009a, 197). Licensed banks were the only
type of bank allowed to accept consumer deposits less than HKD 100,000 (approximately
USD 13,000) (HKMA n.d.). Notably, the deposit guarantee scheme announced alongside the
CBCF expanded deposit insurance to banks outside this “licensed” classification (FS 2008;
HKDPB n.d.).
7. Individual Participation Limits: There does not appear to have been any stated
limit on individual institutions’ participation, given the lack of broadly applied
terms.
The only apparent limit on the amount of funding available to an institution seemed to be
the available amount in the Exchange Fund.
8. Capital Characteristics: There seems to have been no specifics with regard to the
terms of the capital investments under the CBCF.
HKMA would have designed the structure of CBCF investments with consideration for each
requesting bank’s individual circumstances (HKMA 2008a, 3). Without a stated structure
design or any ultimate usage of the program, it is not clear what kind of structure the
HKMA injections would have assumed.
9. Other Conditions: The HKMA signaled that CBCF capital would come with
conditions.
It appears any injections would have come with conditions that encouraged banks to
replace the Exchange Fund’s investment with private capital (HKMA 2008b). HKMA Chief
Executive Yam noted that banks would prefer private capital to the CBCF due to the
enhanced restrictions and supervisory measures that would be attached to that latter (Yam
2008a).
10. Exit Strategy: The CBCF closed on December 31, 2010, as originally announced.
Had the financial secretary made investments under the CBCF, it is not clear how long the
Exchange Fund would have held onto any shares.
11. Regulatory Changes: The creation of the CBCF did not include any regulatory
changes.
HKMA Chief Executive Yam stated that, alongside the CBCF, the HKMA would adopt a
“flexible approach to adjusting the ‘premium’ over the statutory capital adequacy ratio” for
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individual banks, but it is not clear how this flexibility would have interacted with capital
injections pursuant to the CBCF (Yam 2009, 8).
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